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INTRODUCTION

Prosecutors occupy a special place in American legal ethics
scholarship. Their distinct ethical obligation as ministers of justice1
coupled with their troubling ethical failures in practice, 2 have inspired
cogent analysis and biting criticism. 3 For decades American scholars

* University of Warwick
** University of Calgary
1. Berger v. United States 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
2. See, e.g., Monroe Freedman, The Use of Unethical and Unconstitutional Practices and
Policies by Prosecutors’ Offices, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2012); Abbe Smith, Are Prosecutors
Born or Made?, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL STUD. 943 (2012); Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans
Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS.
913 (2012); Bennett L. Gershman, Threats and Bullying by Prosecutors, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
327 (2014); John G. Browning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Digital Age, 77 ALB. L. REV.
881 (2014).
3. Amongst the many brilliant papers by American scholars, the work of Bruce Green, the
late Fred Zacharias and Abbe Smith stand out. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics]; Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 223 (1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility
Codes]; Bruce Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice?”, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607
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have assessed the existence and consequences of deficiencies in
prosecutorial conduct, and proposed solutions to encourage better
behavior. 4
Although this obscures the complexity and nuance of any given
article, the scholarship tends to advance one (or more) of the following
propositions: that prosecutorial misconduct exists and has serious
consequences for the justice and fairness of American criminal law; 5
that the rhetoric surrounding prosecutorial ethics (the “do justice”
imperative) ought to be differently articulated, understood or refined; 6
that prosecutorial misconduct should be more effectively and
comprehensively regulated; 7 and that the structure of prosecutorial
(1992); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 355 (2001).
4. For an early assessment, see Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of
the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030 (1967).
5. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 2; Smith, supra, note 2; Smith, supra, note 3;
Yaroshefsky, supra, note 2; Gershman, supra note 2; Browning, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 3; Green, supra, note 3; Carolyn
Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1309 (2002) (suggesting that the “do justice” imperative is relatively recent); R.
Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us about a
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek Justice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635 (2006); H. Richard
Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1695 (2000); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 259 (2001); Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 309 (2001); Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of
Justice, 86 NEBR. L. REV. 1 (2007); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 79 (2010); Russell M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor’s
Role, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1591 (2014); Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal
Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2016) (playing out a thought experiment on the implications
for justice if prosecutors were adversarial rather than ministers of justice); Eric S. Fish,
Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV 237 (2017).
7. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
461 (2017); Freedman, supra note 2; Browning, supra note 2; Fred C. Zacharias, The
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001) [hereinafter Zacharias,
Professional Discipline]; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2009)
[hereinafter Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions]; Bruce A. Green &
Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutor’s Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002);
Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, WISCONSIN L. REV. 837, 903
(2004) (critiquing the normative idea of prosecutorial neutrality, but also suggesting the need
for “a public articulation of clearer first- and second-order principles that can guide prosecutorial
decisions”) [hereinafter Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality]; Zacharias, Specificity in
Professional Responsibility Code, supra note 3; Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System
WISCONSIN L. REV. 399; (2006); H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct,

2018] PROSECUTORS & JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 589
offices and work responsibilities ought to change to encourage more
ethical and lawful conduct by prosecutors. 8
For the most part, the literature focuses on the experiences and
challenges of American prosecutors, 9 assessing the particular sorts of
misconduct engaged in by American prosecutors, the norms that
govern them, how they are regulated and the structure and culture in
which prosecutors work. That focus is neither wrong nor unsurprising.
Its effect, however, may be to miss insights that can be gained by
looking beyond the American experience. Specifically, if prosecutors
elsewhere engage in misconduct, but work in different legal systems
and cultures than do American prosecutors, it may be possible to refine
the analysis of what it is that causes or can prevent bad behavior by
prosecutors.
This Article provides that sort of comparative analysis. It reviews
the existence of and context for prosecutorial misconduct in Canada
and France, considering both the similarities and differences from the
American experience. It observes that in both countries, as in America,
prosecutorial misconduct occurs and is a significant problem for the
fair and proper administration of criminal justice. The nature of that
misconduct is, however, different in some respects from the American
experience; in neither Canada nor France can prosecutors use the
existence of severe mandatory minimum sentences to coerce plea
bargains from a criminal accused. In Canada plea bargaining is an
important part of the criminal justice system, but an accused who goes
to trial has not traditionally faced materially higher sanctions than an
accused who enters a plea before trial. In France, although a formal

Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51 (2013); Melanie D. Wilson,
Anti-Justice, 81 TENNESSEE L. REV. 699 (2014) (arguing that lack of public scrutiny leads to
prosecutors failing to do justice).
8. Uviller, supra note 6; Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good
Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENNSYLVANIA ST. L. REV. 1133 (2005); Daniel S. Medwed, The
Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction
Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2009); Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse?
How the American Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN
L.J. 513 (2012); Fish, supra note 6; Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009).
9. For exceptions, see ERIK LUNA & MARIANNE WADE, THE PROSECUTOR IN
PERSPECTIVE (2012); Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1413 (2010) [hereinafter Luna & Wade, Prosecutors as Judges]; Michael Tonry,
Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2012).

590

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

“guilty plea” procedure was introduced in 2004, 10 it remains limited to
minor and middle-ranking offenses 11 and does not lead to a negotiation
on charges in practice. 12
In both countries, as in America, the norms governing prosecutors
focus on the prosecutors’ responsibilities to do justice and to ensure a
fair trial for an accused. And in both countries, those norms fail to
consistently generate conduct by prosecutors that matches those norms
and do not provide ways to cogently explain the difference between
good conduct by prosecutors and bad. 13 As well, neither country
effectively regulates bad conduct by prosecutors. In Canada, a
prosecutor’s failures during a criminal trial may result in a successful
application for a mistrial, or even a stay of proceedings, but they are
highly unlikely to result in professional discipline for the misbehaving
prosecutor. 14 In France, disciplinary proceedings before the Conseil
Supérieur de la Magistrature (“CSM” or "High Council for the
Judiciary”) against public prosecutors are rare, particularly with
regards to their behavior during criminal proceedings. 15
Finally, prosecutors in Canada and in France have professional
responsibilities and work structures and environments that vary from
those in the United States, to a greater (e.g., France) or lesser (e.g.,
Canada) extent. Canadian prosecutors are not elected. They work as
civil servants for either the provincial Attorney General (primarily) or
for the federal Public Prosecution Service (secondarily, and mostly in
10. Comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité [Procedure on prior
recognition of guilt] (“CRPC”) (2004) (Fr.). See Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty Pleas and the
Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice, in ERIK LUNA & MARIANNE
WADE, supra note 9, at 116–34.
11. In this procedure, the prosecutor can offer a sentence to the defendant if the offense is
admitted, but the sentence cannot exceed one year in prison.
12. See Laurène Soubise, Guilty Pleas in an Inquisitorial Setting – An Empirical Study of
France, 45 J. L. & Soc’y 398, 418 (2018).
13. See Alice Woolley, Reconceiving the Standard Conception of the Prosecutor’s Role,
95 CANADIAN B. REV. 795 (2017).
14. See ALICE WOOLLEY, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN CANADA § 9.86- 9.93.
(2d ed. 2017).
15. Disciplinary proceedings were started against a single prosecutor in 2016; two in 2015
(including one for having made discriminatory comments about the travelers’ community during
a hearing); and six in 2014. Most disciplinary proceedings concern behaviors independent of
any criminal case (i.e., prosecutors committing criminal offences in their private life): Les
compétences disciplinaires du CSM, CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE LA MAGISTRATURE,
http://www.conseil-superieur-magistrature.fr/missions/discipline/arborescence-des-decisionset-avis-disciplinaires [https://perma.cc/V5CM-5GSV].
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relation to drug offences). Canadian prosecutors individually and
collectively enjoy significant independence. They are largely immune
from regulation by provincial law societies, from judicial review of
exercises of prosecutorial discretion, or for an action in wrongful
prosecution. 16 Courts also defer to decisions made by prosecutors at
trial. 17 Canadian prosecutors do, however, receive considerable
direction in the form of departmental guidelines, particularly in relation
to how they ought to exercise prosecutorial discretion. 18
French prosecutors are not elected either. The French public
prosecution service is organized hierarchically with the Minister of
Justice, a member of the government, at the top of the pyramid. The
primary source of guidance to prosecutors in France is the law, voted
upon by Parliament. Government’s instructions are also communicated
to procureurs (French public prosecutors) through circulars issued by
the Minister of Justice. In practice, the organization in separate remits
allows each procureur to work relatively independently on their own
files, under the overarching (but relatively distant) authority of the head
of each local office. 19
Considering these similarities and differences between the United
States, Canada and France suggests to us the following propositions in
relation to the American literature on professional misconduct. First,
creating appropriate norms around prosecutorial behavior, or refining
the norms that currently exist, is unlikely to result in any material shift
in how prosecutors behave. In each country, the robust support for
prosecutors as quasi-ministers of justice has failed to produce
consistently ethical behavior. The behavior of prosecutors routinely
fails to match the norms said to govern that behavior. The nature of
prosecutorial misconduct in each country—that it exists, but the
different shape that it takes—seems logically connected to the
substantive criminal law and to the specific duties of prosecutors in
each country in relation to enforcing the criminal law. This suggests, in
our view, that reforming prosecutorial conduct requires a primary focus
16. For an overview, see supra note 14, at §§ 9.7-9.120.
17. See discussion infra Part III.
18. See id.; see also e.g., R. v. Anderson, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, para. 58 (Can.); DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE OF CANADA DESKBOOK (2014), available at
https://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/d-g-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4D5U-3NSH].
19. Jacqueline Hodgson & Laurène Soubise, Prosecution in France, OXFORD
HANDBOOKS ONLINE (2016), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199935383.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935383-e-124 [https://perma.cc/PMP8-HXC7].
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on ensuring that the structure and work responsibilities of prosecutors
encourage and incentivize the type of actions we want prosecutors to
take (and discourages and disincentives the type of actions we don’t
want prosecutors to take). Improved professional regulation is part of
this structural change. This change may not be possible in practice, as
suggested by the unwillingness of any jurisdiction to meaningfully
regulate prosecutors, but we do not see any other means to effectively
address problems with prosecutorial behavior.
To make this argument, Part II of this Article provides an
overview of the nature of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States
and scholarly responses to that misconduct. Part III reviews the
circumstances and issues related to misconduct by Canadian
prosecutors. Part IV sets out the role played by French prosecutors in
an inquisitorial system, focusing on the expectations of prosecutors and
the gap between those expectations and actual practice. Part V sets out
the conclusions that we argue follow from this comparative review and,
in particular, what it suggests about how we can best address the crossnational problems of prosecutorial misconduct.
II. AMERICA
Prosecutorial misconduct is a significant issue in American
criminal justice. 20 While undoubtedly many prosecutors act ethically
and responsibly, 21 American case law and scholarship documents
20. John Browning defines prosecutorial misconduct as “what occurs when a prosecutor
deliberately engages in dishonest or fraudulent behavior calculated to produce an unjust result.”
Browning, supra note 2, at 881. Gershman has a similar view about the importance of
prosecutorial intention. See Gershman, supra note 2, at 160. However, Gershman also suggests
that courts should “presume that a prosecutor’s conduct is planned.” Problematic prosecutorial
conduct can, however, be both intentional and unintentional—a prosecutor may simply not
perceive the risk of injustice occasioned by a particular decision. Whether or not that prosecutor
deserves to be sanctioned is a different question than whether or not the behavior creates a risk
of injustice. See generally Alafair Burke, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations: What Really Works?: Talking about Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO. L. REV. 2119
(2010). For the purposes of this Article, our concern is both with the deliberate misconduct
identified by Browning, and conduct which in effect improperly undermines the fairness of the
process or outcome of a criminal trial.
21. Bruce Green has suggested that prosecutor’s offices accept the “do justice”
requirement and often adopt “internal guidelines establishing restraints on prosecutorial conduct
in addition to those imposed by law or by ethics rules.” Green, supra note 3, at 616-17.
Elsewhere Zacharias and Green suggest that prosecutors “rarely deserve exclusive or primary
blame for the conviction of innocent defendants . . . [but] they invariably play some role in
producing them.” Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7, at
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troubling ethical lapses both in commencing and prosecuting criminal
trials. In an informal survey of fifty defense lawyers, Abbe Smith
discovered that those lawyers describe only between two and fifteen
percent of the prosecutors they deal with as not “smug, self-important,
or lacking in imagination.” 22 Peter Joy has observed that “prosecutorial
misconduct has proven to be one of the most common factors that
causes or contributes to wrongful convictions.” 23 Daniel Epps notes
that “[w]hile many prosecutors discharge their duties honorably, too
many shirk their ethical duties sometimes doggedly pursuing
defendants despite compelling evidence of innocence—and in far too
many cases have been responsible for serious injustice.” 24
American prosecutors from time to time present false evidence,
fail to provide proper disclosure, pose improper questions to witnesses,
make improper closing arguments, and misrepresent facts to the
court. 25 They intimidate witnesses at grand jury investigations, attack
witnesses for the defense with the threat of perjury charges, bully
witnesses into giving certain kinds of testimony for the prosecution,
compel people to drop civil rights suits against the police through the
threat of prosecution, use shaming of white collar accused to induce
cooperation with the prosecution, and push corporations to give up their
employees to avoid criminal prosecution. 26 Some American
prosecutors engage in inappropriate ex parte communications and
make improper public statements about on-going litigation. 27 They
unduly resist post-conviction motions challenging the validity of a
conviction. 28 Frequently, they use the structure of American criminal
6 and 8. Melanie Wilson has argued that the prosecutors “effectively fulfill” the duty to do justice
in charging, trial and sentencing decisions because the “prosecutor’s role is defined adequately
and her power constrained sufficiently by outside scrutiny.” Wilson supra note 7, at 703-04.
22. Smith, supra note 2, at 953-54.
23. Joy, supra note 7, at 403. Zacharias and Green suggest that while prosecutors “rarely
deserve exclusive or primary blame for the conviction of innocent defendants” but that “they
invariably play some role in producing them.” Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions, supra note 7, at 6, 8.
24. Epps, supra note 6, at 765. Zacharias noted “[a]llegations of prosecutorial misconduct
abound in the cases and academic literature.” Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 7,
at 725.
25. Freedman, supra note 2; Zacharias Professional Discipline, supra note 7, at 731;
Yaroshefsky, supra note 2; Hoeffel, supra note 8; Smith, supra note 3, at 391; Joy, supra note
7, at 402-03.
26. Gershman, supra note 2.
27. Browning, supra note 2. Browning notes a wide range of cases where prosecutors have
committed misconduct through technology.
28. Medwed, supra note 8.
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justice, including its imposition of severe mandatory minimums, as a
tool for effectively coercing an accused to accept a plea. As described
by Jonathan Rapping:
Today, more than ninety-five per cent of all criminal cases are
resolved through guilty pleas. Our legal system, which now leaves
so many little option but to plead guilty, has evolved because so
many prosecutors take advantage of one or more of the following
structural realities: (1) a more expansive criminal code, harsher
sentences, and broader criminal liability; (2) excessive bail
schemes that often leave poor people with no choice but to accept
a plea in exchange for freedom; and (3) overburdened court
appointed lawyers who have neither the time nor resources to
adequately prepare for trial or advise their clients. For the
prosecutor who takes as given the unmanageable number of cases
in an underfunded system, and who views his or her obligation as
securing as many convictions as possible, taking advantage of
these features might seem to be effective law enforcement. But this
prosecutor has a misunderstanding of what justice truly means and
his or her duty to achieve it. 29

And even ethical prosecutors in America can only do as much
justice as the American system of criminal justice permits which, as
Abbe Smith has cogently argued, may not be enough:
Prosecutors uphold the banishment of a generation of African
American men simply by playing their role in the context of
today’s criminal justice system. The government has devoted an
arsenal of resources to a mean-spirited and misguided criminal
justice policy that has literally stolen hope for the next generation
from entire communities. There is no redemption under this
policy, no belief that people who have done wrong could ever rise
above their pasts and contribute something of value. There is only
the prison cell. It is the role of the prosecutor, the government’s
lawyer, to carry out these policies. 30

29. Rapping, supra note 8, at 551. Smith, supra note 3, at 391. Richard Uviller notes that,
as a prosecutor, the decision to commence or continue with charges was much more difficult to
make impartially once trial preparation started: “I was just too zipped, buckled, and helmeted
into my flight suit at that point to think about much else than the impending trial mission.”
Uviller, supra note 6, at 1695. Rachel Barkow also discusses how the intersection of
prosecutorial decisions and systemic factors creates a real risk for prosecutorial abuse of power.
Barkow, supra note 8, at 878-83.
30. Smith, supra note 3, at 374.
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Commentators have not identified an adequate solution to the
problem of prosecutorial misconduct—that is, one likely to be both
effective and practically possible to implement. As evidenced by
President Donald Trump’s pardon of Sherriff Joe Arpaio, not everyone
views aggressive and even unlawful efforts to “fight crime” as a social
problem that needs solving. 31 American prosecutors work at the
federal, state and county level. Some are elected. Some are civil
servants. The circumstances under which prosecutors work, the
incentives to which they are subject, and the substantive law they apply,
vary considerably. 32 No singular response can sufficiently account for
that variation and address the different sorts of prosecutorial
misconduct that it produces.
With that said, commentators have responded to deficiencies in
prosecutorial conduct. Many have discussed issues in the overarching
obligation of prosecutors to do justice, 33 the lack of meaningful
direction it provides to prosecutors, its inherent vagueness, and the
irreducible conflict between the duty as stated and the prosecutor’s
obligation as an adversarial advocate. 34 Abbe Smith argues that the
exhortation to do justice corrupts prosecutorial ethics, encouraging
prosecutorial arrogance and abuse of power: “too often righteousness
31. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who Became
Face
of
Crackdown
on
Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
25,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trump-pardon-sheriffarizona.html?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
32. See, e.g., Hoeffel, supra note 8, at 1138-39.
33. “The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all, and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
The American Bar Association Rule 3.8, Commentary 1 states “A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that
guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to
prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 3.8, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
34. See, e.g., Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 3, at
250 (“Different prosecutors . . . can justify diametrically opposite conduct as serving justice.”);
Green, supra note 3, at 616, 622 (“Standing alone, the injunction points in many directions . . .
The injunction may even point in contradictory directions.”); Joy, supra note 7, at 400, 427;
Medwed, supra note 8, at 42; Epps, supra note 6, at 783 (“This conception of the prosecutorial
role has problems. For one, the content of the norm is famously hard to pin down. What does it
mean for a prosecutor to “seek justice”?”); Rapping, supra note 8, at 519 (“This imprecision [in
the duty] has left prosecutors to define their role as they see fit.”); Caldwell, supra note 7, at 57.
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becomes self-righteousness. Too often prosecutors believe that because
it is their job to do justice, they have extraordinary in-born wisdom and
insight. Too often prosecutors believe that they and only they know
what justice is.” 35 It gives prosecutors the “white hat” in the
courtroom. 36
In response commentators have sought to clarify and improve the
“do justice” ethic. Bruce Green and Fred Zacharias in particular, both
together and individually have done remarkable work to make sense of
the “do justice” obligation and its relationship to the prosecutor’s
adversarial advocacy.
Zacharias argued that the obligation to “do justice” can be made
coherent if you see it as having two essential elements: an obligation
not to prosecute absent a good faith belief in an accused’s guilt and an
obligation to “ensure that the basic elements of the adversary system
exist” in a criminal trial. 37 The obligation is not to ensure that a trial
achieves a just outcome, substantively speaking; the obligation is to
ensure the accomplishment of the adversarial process on which justice
depends. That obligation would give rise to special duties for the
prosecutor where there is inadequate defense counsel, where the
resources are unequal such that “competent defense attorneys lack the
tools to offer a vigorous case, despite their best efforts” 38 and where
the process fails from, for example, biased or over-reactive tribunals. It
also requires the prosecutor to respect limits on some adversarial tactics
that do not apply to defense counsel. 39 Zacharias noted significant
issues with this articulation of the duty but suggested that it “would
have some effect on prosecutorial conduct.” 40
Green has argued that the prosecutor’s obligation to do justice
flows from the fact that the prosecutor acts as a proxy for the sovereign,
and the sovereign’s interest is in substantive justice. As such, the
prosecutor’s duty requires punishing the guilty, avoiding the
punishment of the innocent, and ensuring that “people are treated fairly.
As the government’s surrogate, the prosecutor’s job is to carry out all

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Smith, supra note 3, at 378.
Hoeffel, supra note 8, at 1140.
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 3, at 50.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 66-94.
Id. at 108.
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these objectives and resolve the tension among them.” 41 Green argued
that this approach can be reconciled with the prosecutor’s “instinct to
do battle;” this reconciliation simply requires that prosecutors restrict
that instinct to cases that warrant it, bearing in mind as well other
objectives the government ought to pursue. 42
Together Green and Zacharias explored the capacity of the
principle of neutrality to inform prosecutorial decision-making. 43 In
their view the principle of neutrality could be further articulated to
suggest that prosecutorial decision-making should be non-biased, nonpartisan and principled. 44 They suggested, however, that neither the
general concept of neutrality nor these more articulated sub-principles
could on their own guide prosecutorial decision-making. 45 The
meaning of the principles and sub-principles is variable and how they
fit together uncertain. 46 They cannot ultimately provide meaningful
guidance “for the discretionary decisions that prosecutors routinely
must make.” 47 Green and Zacharias sought “deeper thinking by
prosecutors and for a public articulation of clearer first- and secondorder principles that can guide prosecutors’ decisions.” 48
Others have suggested that prosecutor’s overarching duty ought
to be “to the truth,” 49 that the prosecutor’s obligation should be infused
with the norms and practices of virtue ethics, in which the focus “is on
the character of individual prosecutors making discretionary
decisions,” 50 that it should require prosecutors to suppress
constitutionally dubious evidence even where that evidence might be
admissible in court, 51 and have even explored the thought experiment
that perhaps less injustice would result if prosecutors were consistently
adversarial instead of seeking to do justice. 52

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Green, supra note 3, at 642.
Id.
Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, supra note 7.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 860.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Gershman, supra note 6, at 314.
Cassidy, supra note 6, at 639.
Gold, supra note 6, at 1660.
Epps, supra note 6, at 852.

598

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

In addition to suggesting changes to how we articulate and
understand the general norms governing prosecutorial conduct,
scholars have assessed the ability to use regulatory mechanisms to
improve prosecutorial conduct. American prosecutors can face
consequences for making poor choices in the conduct of a matter—
having a conviction overturned, for example—and have been subject
to disciplinary proceedings. 53 As a general matter, however, the
disciplinary rules governing prosecutorial behavior are loosely drafted,
generously interpreted and rarely result in professional discipline.54
Prosecutors also enjoy immunity from civil liability for many of the
decisions made with respect to a prosecution. 55 Reforms that have been
considered include clarifying and providing more precise and useful
direction in disciplinary codes, 56 broadening the scope of civil liability
for prosecutors, 57 creating an independent commission for addressing
prosecutorial impropriety, 58 and using competency provisions in codes
of conduct to discipline prosecutors for actions that are reasonably

53. See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 7, at 744-45:
This study . . . dispels at least one myth: that prosecutors are never disciplined.
Nevertheless, many of the cases are old, making the number of reported cases far
from staggering in light of the many prosecutors and criminal cases that exist. Still
the body of cases is not entirely negligible. The research suggests at least that, in
appropriate cases, courts and disciplinary organizations sometimes have been willing
to address prosecutorial misconduct.
He notes that discipline tends to occur for illegal activity, for “procedural and evidentiary
misconduct” and for “abusive behavior toward tribunals”). Id. at 746. See also Charles Maclean
& Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in the Quiver: Mapping the Contours of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 25 WASHBURN L. J. 59 (2012),
54. See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 7; Zacharias, Specificity in
Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 3; Freedman, supra note 2,
55. Green, supra note 7, at 483:
At least on the federal level, courts have shown little inclination to encourage civil
lawsuits against prosecutors by lowering the bars posed by doctrines of absolute and
qualified immunity. On the contrary, Supreme Court decisions have largely protected
prosecutors from civil lawsuits arising out of professional misconduct, in part based
on the stated assumption that professional discipline will fill the voice
See also, Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7.
56. Joy, supra note 7, at 401; Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes,
supra note 3. But see Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note
7, at 58 (“[I]t is difficult to draft specific rules capturing all risky prosecutorial conduct that, in
hindsight, should be deemed improper.”)
57. Green, supra note 7, at 483.
58. Caldwell, supra note 7.
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likely to result in wrongful convictions. 59 Zacharias and Green have
suggested, however, that “[s]tanding alone, the disciplinary process
will never adequately hold errant prosecutors accountable for their role
in bringing about wrongful convictions.” 60
Finally, some American scholars have explored the possibility of
shifting the structure, culture and work environment of prosecutors to
improve prosecutorial conduct. The most significant involve separating
the investigative, adjudicative functions from the prosecutor’s role as
an advocate:
I believe that for the office of prosecutor faithfully to discharge the
incompatible roles of advocate and arbiter, the investigators and
adjudicators should be segregated from the advocates. I do not say
that the two bands cannot live happily under one roof, both
responsible to the same chief. But I do think that those who
investigate, assess, and negotiate settlement should belong to a
different cadre from those who try the cases that fail to reach
accord. 61

Other suggestions include shifting the cultural expectations of
prosecutorial offices 62 and having prosecutor’s offices set out the
fundamental norms that ought to govern prosecutorial decisionmaking. 63 Those commenters claim that articulating the “principles and
subprinciples of prosecution . . . can make the exercise of discretion
more thoughtful, enable well-intentioned prosecutors to reach
decisions with reference to impersonal norms, narrow inconsistency
within a prosecutor’s office, and facilitate review by supervisory
prosecutors.” 64
59. Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7. However,
Zacharias and Green ultimately conclude that such enforcement is not feasible. Indeed, they
question generally “the viability of professional discipline as the principle mechanism for
regulating the prosecution corps.” Id. at 58.
60. Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7, at 58-59.
61. Uviller, supra note 6, at 1702. See also Barkow, supra note 8,
62. Rapping, supra note 8,
63. Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, supra note 7, at 904.
64. Green & Zacharias, supra note 7, at 886. See also Fish, supra note 6, at 270-71:
[I]ndividual prosecutors’ choices should be constrained through system-level rules
that compel prosecutors to incorporate constitutional rights into their decision
making. Such rules can be established at a number of different levels: individual
offices, larger prosecution bureaucracies, or state bar associations. They can be
implemented in a variety of ways: training prosecutors, imposing internal discipline,
centralizing decisionmaking authority, creating positions tasked with protecting
constitutional rights, and imposing bar sanctions.
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This brief overview indicates that issues with prosecutorial
conduct in America arise with respect to both exercises of prosecutorial
discretion (charging and plea offers) and the conduct of a matter. The
responses to that conduct involve trying to better understand and
articulate the norms governing prosecutorial conduct, enhancing
regulation of prosecutors, and shifting the culture and structure of
prosecutorial work. The next Parts will consider prosecutorial conduct
(and misconduct) in Canada and France before turning to what those
comparisons reveal about the options for addressing prosecutorial
misconduct discussed in the American literature.
III. CANADA
Canadian prosecutors work as civil servants for either the
provincial or federal governments, with prosecutorial authority
reflecting the division of powers between these two levels of
government. Provincial prosecutors prosecute offences committed
under the Criminal Code of Canada and provincial statutes, 65 while
federal prosecutors prosecute drug offenses under the Controlled Drugs
and Substances Act, 66 and crimes under other federal statutes such as
the Income Tax Act. 67 As is the case with American prosecutors,
Canadian prosecutors exercise prosecutorial discretion to make
“decisions regarding the nature and extent of [a] prosecution and the
Attorney General’s participation in it.” 68 This includes the power to

65. See PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE OF CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT, 2011-2012 7
(2012), http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/ar-ra/2011_2012/ar12-ra12.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LSR9-VYX8].
66. Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (Can.).
67. Federal prosecutors also prosecute crimes under the Criminal Code in the three
territories: the Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. See PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE
OF CANADA, supra note 65, at 4. The reason for the slightly counter-intuitive nature of the
division of responsibilities between federal and provincial prosecutors is that under Canadian
division of powers the federal government has responsibility for “[t]he Criminal Law, except
the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal
Matters.” Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, 91(27) (U.K.). The provincial government
has responsibility for “The administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution,
Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction,
and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.” Id.
68. Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, para. 47 (Can.); R. v.
Anderson, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, para. 44 (Can.).
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enter into plea agreements with the accused. 69 They have a
constitutional obligation to provide full disclosure to the accused,
including disclosure of exculpatory information. 70 They conduct
criminal trials in courts structured on an adversarial model. This is the
case even in the province of Québec, which uses the civil code rather
than common law in civil matters. The trial courts of Québec are
adversarial, and matters of criminal law and evidence are governed by
the common law. As in the United States, there is no functional
separation between prosecutors who exercise discretion about whether
to commence or continue a criminal proceeding, and the prosecutors
who conduct a criminal trial.
Guidance for and control of prosecutorial decision-making arises
from three sources: guidelines published by the provincial or federal
department for which the prosecutor works, provincial law society
codes of conduct, and case law. Each of the provinces and the federal
government publish a policy manual or deskbook that sets out
guidelines directing prosecutorial behavior. 71 The policy manuals
affirm the overarching duty of Canadian prosecutors to be ministers of
justice. 72 More specifically, the guidelines require that decisions to
prosecute be based primarily on whether there is sufficient evidence to
justify bringing or continuing proceedings and, secondarily, whether a
prosecution is in the public interest. 73 The guidelines provide
considerable detail about how a prosecutor ought to assess a case in
light of these criteria, requiring that the prosecutor’s assessment be
69. Anderson, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 45; R. v. Nixon, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (Can.)
(holding prosecutorial discretion includes the Crown’s power to repudiate a plea agreement).
70. R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (Can.).
71. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18; NEW BRUNSWICK OFFICE OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL, PUBLIC PROSECUTION OPERATIONAL MANUAL (2016), available at
http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/departments/attorney_general/operational_manual.html
[https://perma.cc/4P22-9WSP]; ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., ONTARIO
CROWN POLICY MANUAL (2017), available at https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/
english/crim/cpm/ [https://perma.cc/6GUU-G736]; ALBERTA JUSTICE AND SOLICITOR
GENERAL, ALBERTA CROWN PROSECUTOR’S MANUAL (2015),
available at
https://justice.alberta.ca/programs_services/criminal_pros/Publications%20Library%20%20Cri
minal%20Prosecutions/CrownProsecutorsManual.aspx; BRITISH COLUMBIA PROSECUTION
SERV., BRITISH COLUMBIA CROWN COUNSEL POLICY MANUAL (2018), available at
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/justice/criminal-justice/bc-prosecution-service/crowncounsel-policy-manual [https://perma.cc/7A6W-2RD6].
72. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, §§ 2, 2.1.
73. Id. at §2.3.2. For a more detailed discussion of how the guidelines constrain the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see WOOLLEY, supra note 14, at §9.30-§9.36.
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“objective” rather than a matter of personal opinion. 74 The guidelines
also address a prosecutor’s conduct of a trial, identifying the
prosecutor’s duties, which are the same as those that apply to any trial
lawyer. 75 For example, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada
Deskbook provides:
In order to maintain public confidence in the administration of
justice, Crown counsel must not only act fairly; their conduct must
be seen to be fair. One can act fairly while unintentionally leaving
an impression of secrecy, bias or unfairness.
Counsel fulfill this duty by:
•

making disclosure in accordance with the law;

•

bringing all relevant cases and authorities known to counsel to
the attention of the court, even if they may be contrary to the
Crown’s position;

•

not misleading the court;

•

not expressing personal opinions on the evidence, including
the credibility of witnesses or on the guilt or innocence of the
accused in court or in public. Such expressions of opinion are
improper;

•

not adverting to any unproven facts, even if they are material
and could have been admitted as evidence;

•

asking relevant and proper questions during the examination
of a witness and not asking questions designed solely to
embarrass, insult, abuse, belittle, or demean the witness. Cross
examination can be skilful and probing, yet still show respect
for the witness. The law distinguishes between a crossexamination that is “persistent and exhaustive”, which is
proper, and a cross-examination that is “abusive”;

•

stating the law accurately in oral pleadings;

•

respecting defence counsel, the accused, and the proceedings
while vigorously asserting the Crown’s position, and not
publicly and improperly criticizing defence strategy;

74. DAVID LAYTON & MICHEL PROULX, ETHICS AND CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 603
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2d ed. 2015). See also Miazga v. Kvello Estate, [2009] S.C.R. 339, at
para. 66 (Can.).
75. See WOOLLEY, supra note 14, at §9.97.
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•

respecting the court and judicial decisions and not publicly
disparaging judgments; and

•

avoiding themselves engaging in active “judge shopping”. 76

Prosecutors are also advised of the importance of “fairness,
moderation, and dignity” accompanying “vigorous and thorough
prosecutions.” 77
Prosecutors’ obligations under provincial and federal guidelines
are purportedly subject to enforcement through internal disciplinary
processes, although the nature and extent of that enforcement is
unknown.
Law society codes of conduct provide minimal specific direction
to prosecutors. The general duty imposed on prosecutors to “act for the
public and the administration of justice resolutely and honorably within
the limits of the law while treating the tribunal with candor, fairness,
courtesy and respect” is nearly identical to the obligations imposed on
all lawyers when acting as advocates, except that prosecutors “act for
the public and the administration of justice” instead of “represent the
client.” 78 The codes go on to add in the commentary:
When engaged as a prosecutor, the lawyer’s primary duty is not to
seek to convict but to see that justice is done through a fair trial on
the merits. The prosecutor exercises a public function involving
much discretion and power and must act fairly and dispassionately.
The prosecutor should not do anything that might prevent the
accused from being represented by counsel or communicating with
counsel and, to the extent required by law and accepted practice,
should make timely disclosure to defence counsel or directly to an
unrepresented accused of all relevant and known facts and
witnesses, whether tending to show guilt or innocence. 79

As Woolley has noted elsewhere, however, the duties identified
in the commentary “seem largely to be a context-specific iteration of
general principles requiring all lawyers to comply with their legal and
constitutional obligations.” 80 Further, provincial law societies almost
never discipline prosecutors. Of 2,200 disciplinary decisions issued by
76. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at §2.3.
77. Id.at §2.2.2.
78. FED. OF L. SOCIETIES, MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 5.1-3, 5.1-1. The
Federation’s Code has been substantially adopted in all Canadian provinces, including this rule.
79. Id. at r. 5.1-3, cmt 1.
80. WOOLLEY, supra note 14, at §9.96.
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the Law Society of Ontario 81 over a twenty-three year period, only nine
involved prosecutors. 82 Databases containing law society disciplinary
decisions reveal only a handful addressing the conduct of
prosecutors. 83
By far the most significant source of guidance and regulation of
prosecutors arises from judicial decisions. Courts have established the
overarching duty of Canadian prosecutors, like their American
counterparts, to seek justice: “His duty is not so much to obtain a
conviction as to assist the judge and jury in ensuring that the fullest
possible justice is done;” 84 “[t]he role of prosecutor excludes any
notion of winning or losing.” 85 As in the United States, that duty is
poorly explained, inherently ambiguous and more a source of judicial
platitudes than rigorous explanation of a prosecutor’s duties in a
criminal trial. 86
However, courts have attempted to set out a prosecutor’s duties
with respect to the conduct of a criminal matter, particularly in relation
to disclosure, 87 making statements to the court (including to a jury),88
cross-examining witnesses, 89 the presentation of evidence, 90 treatment

81. The Law Society of Upper Canada changed its name in 2017 to the Law Society of
Ontario. See Joseph Brean, Law Society to drop ‘Upper Canada’ from its name after report calls
it elitist and offensive, NATIONAL POST (Sept. 29, 2017), http://nationalpost.com/
news/canada/law-society-to-drop-upper-canada [https://perma.cc/6SWS-SQCN].
82. Jennifer Paglioro & Jayme Poisson, Ontario fails to track complaints against Crown
attorneys, TORONTO STAR (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.thestar.com/news/queenspark/
2014/12/16/ontario_fails_to_track_complaints_against_crown_attorneys.html
[https://perma.cc/WJW4-HADG].
83. See generally, WOOLLEY, supra note 14, at §§9.100, 9.87-9.92.
84. R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R. 16, 21 (Can.).
85. Id. at 24. See also R. v. Swietlinski, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 481, 494-95 (Can.); R. v. Regan,
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, ¶ 155-56 (Can.) (Binnie, J., dissenting on other grounds).
86. See Woolley, supra note 13.
87. See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 2 (Can.).
88. See, e.g., Boucher, [1955] S.C.R., at 2384 (Can.); R. v. Manasseri, (2016) O.R. 3d 401,
¶ 103-04 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
89. See R. v. Ahmed, [2015] O.A.C. 751, para. 39 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lagiacco, [1984],
11 C.C.C. 3d 374, 383-84 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
90. See, e.g., R. v. Cook, [1997] S.C.R. 1113, 1114-15 (Can.); R. v. Hillis, 2016 CanLII
451, para. 20 (Can. Ont.); R. v. MacInnis, [2007] 163 C.R.R. 2d 111 (ONSCJ) (Can.); R. v.
Zelitt, 2003 CanLII 2 (Can. Alta.).
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of self-represented accused, 91 jury selection, 92 consenting to trial by
judge alone, 93 the handling of witnesses, 94 the treatment of accused
charged from the same incident, 95 and the Crown’s defense of a
publication ban. 96
Despite this, Courts have also made it clear that Canadian
prosecutors enjoy considerable independence from judicial oversight.
While courts will assess whether a prosecutor’s conduct of a matter has
undermined trial fairness such that a new trial or other relief for the
accused is warranted, they defer to counsel decisions on strategy. 97 In
addition, they will not ordinarily review a prosecutor’s exercise of
discretion about whether and how to proceed against the accused. A
court will only review an exercise of prosecutorial discretion ex ante
where there has been an abuse of process or, ex post, where the tort of
malicious prosecution is made out. To be an abuse of process, the
prosecutor must have acted in a way “that is egregious and seriously
compromises trial fairness and/or the integrity of the justice system.”98
The accused must establish a “proper evidentiary foundation” for the
claim of abuse of process, 99 and courts will presume that “prosecutorial
discretion is exercised in good faith.” 100 To establish malicious
prosecution, a former accused must show, amongst other things, that
the prosecutor “deliberately intended to subvert or abuse the office of
the Attorney General or the process of criminal justice”; 101 mere
91. R. v. Burns, [1993] 136 N.B.R. 2d 166 (CACA Can.); R v. Vu, [2004] O.T.C. 1196
(ONSCJ) (Can.).
92. See, e.g., R. v. Biddle, [1995] S.C.R. 761, para. 50 (Can.) (Gonthier, J., concurring);
R. v. Gayle, (2001), O.R. 3d 36 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Bain, [1992] S.C.R. 91, 93-94 (Can.).
93. See, e.g., R. v. Bird, (1996) Alta. L.R. 3d 128 (Can. Alta.), 185 A.R. 201 (QB); R. v.
Effert, (2008) Atla. L.R. 4th 200 (Can. Atla.).
94. See R. v. Spackman, 2009 CanLII 37920, 64 (Can. Ont.).
95. R. v. Lacroix, [2007] ONCJ 540 (Can.).
96. R. v. Brown (L.A.), [1988] 126 C.C.C. 3d 187 (Ont. Gen. Div.). For a more detailed
discussion of the law governing prosecutors, see Woolley, supra note 13, at 800-10.
97. See R. v. Anderson, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, para. 60 (Can.). The Supreme Court has held
that courts have the power to “penalize counsel for ignoring rulings or orders, or for
inappropriate behaviour such as tardiness, incivility, abusive cross-examination, improper
opening or closing addresses or inappropriate attire. Sanctions may include orders to comply,
adjournments, extensions of time, warnings, cost awards, dismissals, and contempt proceedings”
Id. at ¶ 58.
98. See Anderson, [2014] S.C.R., at ¶ 50.
99. See R. v. Nixon, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566, at ¶ 60 (Can.).
100. Anderson, [2014] S.C.R., at ¶ 55.
101. Miazga v. Kvello Estate, [2009] S.C.R. 339, at ¶ 89 (Can.) (emphasis added).
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“incompetence, inexperience, poor judgment, lack of professionalism,
recklessness, honest mistake, negligence, or even gross negligence” is
insufficient. 102
Canadian courts have, however, been willing to hold the state
liable for violation of an accused’s constitutional rights. Section 24(1)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter”) permits
the Court to grant “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and
just in the circumstances” for a violation of a person’s Charter rights or
freedoms. In a recent case, Ivan Henry was awarded $8 million in
Charter damages following his wrongful conviction and twenty-seven
years imprisonment that resulted from a trial in which the Crown
showed a “shocking disregard” for his Charter rights. 103 In addition,
courts have ordered costs against the Crown in response to a Charter
violation, Crown misconduct or similarly serious circumstances; to
justify costs there must be a “‘marked and unacceptable departure from
the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution’, or something
that is ‘rare’ or ‘unique’ that ‘must at least result in something akin to
an extreme hardship on the defendant.’” 104
Canadian prosecutors thus have a general duty to seek justice, as
well more specified obligations as set out in the federal and provincial
policy manuals, and in case law. Prosecutors are, however, subject to
next to no risk of personal regulatory consequences, except as may
occur outside of the public eye in the form of discipline by their
employers.
Nonetheless, Canadian prosecutors do from time to time engage
in misconduct. As in the United States, while troubling prosecutorial
conduct may not be the sole factor in creating wrongful convictions, it
has been a factor in most (and perhaps all) wrongful conviction cases
in Canada. 105 Case law also reveals prosecutors who did the following:
102. Id. at ¶ 81. “In cases subsequent to Miazga, courts have shown themselves reluctant
to even hear claims for wrongful conviction, frequently striking them out or dismissing them,
often because the claiming party would not be able to establish malice.” WOOLEY, supra note
14, §9.59. For a more fulsome discussion of how Canadian courts review prosecutorial
discretion, see id. at §9.43, §9.59.
103. Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), (2016) B.C.S.C. 1038, ¶¶ 472-73 (Can.
B.C.); see Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), [2015] S.C.R 214 (Can.).
104. R. v. Singh, [2016] ONCA 108, ¶ 38 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (quoting R. v Ciarniello, [2006]
O.R. 561 (Can. Ont. C.A).
105. See Miazga, [2009] S.C.R. 51, at ¶ 89; see also Royal Commission on the Donald
Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Digest of Findings and Recommendations (Dec. 1989) (finding that
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failed to satisfy their duty to disclose, sometimes in a serious way; 106
coached their witnesses or asked improper leading questions of their
own witnesses; 107 improperly curated evidence (for example, by not
calling a witness after it became clear that some of the witness’s
evidence would help the accused); 108 conducted abusive, belligerent,
sarcastic, or demeaning cross-examination or asked questions going to
irrelevant or inadmissible matters; 109 and made improper and
inflammatory statements or statements which introduced irrelevant or
inadmissible issues to the court. 110
the prosecutor did not interview witnesses who had given contradictory statements or disclose
those statements to the defense); MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF THE
KAUFMAN COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN (1998) (relating to
reliance on jailhouse informants, lack of disclosure and prosecutorial tunnel vision); David
Asper, “No One’s Interested in Something You Didn’t Do”: Freeing David Milgaard the Ugly
Way, in IN SEARCH OF THE ETHICAL LAWYER: STORIES FROM THE CANADIAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 55-80 (Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley eds., UBC Press 2016).
106. See, e.g., R. v. Illes, [2008] S.C.R. 57; R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.R. 307; R. v. La,
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 680 (Can.); R. v. Wood, (2006) ABCA 343 (Can. Alta. C.A.); R. v. Bain (K.),
[2005] 196 O.A.C. 81 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. O’Grady, (1995) 64 B.C.A.C. 111 (Can. B.C.
C.A.); R. v. S.E.L., 2012 ABQB 190 (Can. Alta. Q.B.); R. v. MacInnis, [2007] 163 C.R.R. (2d)
111 (Can. Ont. S.C.).
107. See, e.g., R. v. Paquette, (2008) ABCA 49 (Can. Alta. C.A.); R. v. Situ, (2005) ABCA
275 (Can. Alta. C.A.); R. v. Rose, [2001] 153 C.C.C. 3d 225 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Peruta,
[1992] 78 C.C.C. 3d 350 (Can. Quebec C.A.); R. v. Spence, [2011] ONSC 2406 (Can. Ont.
S.C.J.).
108. See R. v. Hillis, [2016] ON 451 (Can. Ont. S.C.).
109. See, e.g., R. v. A.G., [2015] ONCA 159, ¶ 43 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (finding crossexamination improper but denying a new trial because “the cross-examination at issue did not
result in a miscarriage of justice”); R. v. Gahan, (2014) NBJ No 77 (Can. C.A.); R. v. Bear,
(2008) SKCA 172 (Can. Saskatchewan C.A.); R. v. Ellard, (2003) BCCA 68 (Can. B.C. C.A.);
R. v. Wojcik, (2002) MBCA 82 (Can. Manitoba C.A.); R. v. Shell, [2002] O.J. No. 3633 (Can.
C.A.); R. v. Rose, [2001] 153 C.C.C. 3d 225 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Henderson, (1999) 44 O.R.
3d 628 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Riche, (1996) NJ No. 293 (Can. Nfld. C.A.); R. v. Bricker, [1994]
90 C.C.C. 3d 268 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Walker, [1994] 90 C.C.C. 3d 144 (Can. Ont. C.A); R.
v. Hillier, (1994) 115 Nfld & PEIR 27 (Can. N.L. C.A.); R. v. R. (A.J.), [1994] 94 C.C.C. 3d
168 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Daly, [1992] 57 O.A.C. 70 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (finding improper crossexamination with sarcasm and editorializing did not warrant new trial); R. v. Logiacco, [1984]
2 O.A.C. 177 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Stewart, [1991] 43 O.A.C. 109 (Can. Ont. C.A.). See also
R. v. Robinson, [2001] 153 C.C.C. 3d 398, ¶ 35 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (noting the cross-examination
had many “questions . . . laced with sarcasm and framed in a manner that made it apparent that
Crown counsel personally held the appellant in utter contempt . . . [and] an attempt at character
assassination”). Robinson subsequently committed an extremely violent sexual assault for which
he was convicted. R. v. Robinson, [2006] 212 C.C.C. 3d 439 (Can. Ont. C.A.)).
110. R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R. 16, 23 (Can.); R. v. A.T., [2015] ONCA 65 (Can. Ont.
C.A.); R. v. Delisle, [2013] QCCA 952 (Can. Que. C.A.); R. v. Mallory, [2007] ONCA 46 (Can.
Ont. C.A.); R. v. Carter, (2005) BCCA 381 (Can. B.C. C.A.); R. v. White, [1997] 99 O.A.C. 1
(Can. Ont. C.A.); Hillier, (1994) 115 Nfld & PEIR; R. v. Peruta, [1992] 51 C.A.Q. 79 (Can.
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Far less evidence exists to suggest that Canadian prosecutors
engage in misconduct in relation to charging or the negotiation of plea
bargains. There are some cases that suggest there may be issues of
concern. In Grenier v. R., the accused had asked to take a polygraph.
Despite the fact that polygraph evidence is inadmissible and of
questionable reliability, the prosecutor made a plea offer in which if the
accused passed a polygraph the charges would be dropped, but if the
accused failed the polygraph he would either have to plead guilty or
forego representation by his present counsel. 111 In R. v. Delchev the
prosecutor offered a plea to an accused on the condition that the
accused both admit that he lied during a preliminary inquiry, and that
his lawyer had known that he was lying. 112 The Ontario Court of
Appeal ordered a new trial in Delchev to allow the trial judge to
consider whether this was an abuse of process; the Court viewed this
conduct as improperly interfering with the relationship between the
accused and his counsel. In general, however, there are fewer
opportunities for Canadian prosecutors to abuse the plea bargaining
process than exist in the United States. Very few crimes in Canada
attract significant mandatory minimum sentences and there is no death
penalty. 113 When, for example, Canada introduced new mandatory
minimum penalties for drug offences where an aggravating factor was
present (for example, where it involved a weapon, violence or a youth)
the mandatory minimum penalties range from nine months to three
years. 114 While this gives the prosecutor some leverage, it is not
particularly consequential. In addition, while legal aid in Canada is not
as well funded as it used to be, and the right to counsel is not as robustly
protected as would be ideal, a person accused of a serious crime is still
likely to be represented by competent counsel. 115 Bail is also relatively
Que. C.A.); R. v. Suarez-Noa, [2015] ONSC 3823 (Can. Ont. S.C.); R. v. Sun, [2002] O.J. No.
2166 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Griffin, [1993] O.J. No. 2573, ¶¶. 25-31 (Can. Ont. C.J. Gen.
Div.); R. v. Porter, [1992] O.J. No. 2931 (Can. Ont. C.J. Gen. Div).
111. For reasons that seem unconvincing, the Court did not find this to be improper
conduct. Grenier v. R., (2014) NB 68 (Can. N.B. Q.B.). For a discussion of the case, see
Woolley, supra note 13.
112. See R. v. Delchev, [2015] ONCA 381, ¶ 67 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
113. See 6.2 Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Particular Drug Offences Under the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, PUB. PROSECUTION SERV. OF CANADA (Mar. 1, 2014),
http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/p6/ch02.html
[https://perma.cc/UAT4-EDFP].
114. Id.
115. See R. v. Rowbotham, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 463 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
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easier to obtain in Canada, and the Supreme Court of Canada has
imposed strict limits on the time the Crown can take in bringing a
matter to trial before charges will be thrown out (although being in
remand in Canada could still incentivize an accused to agree to a
plea). 116
Plea bargaining is a robust part of Canadian criminal justice, but
an accused who goes to trial cannot risk the sorts of consequences
suffered by American accused like Weldon Angelos, a petty marijuana
dealer sentenced to fifty-five years’ incarceration. 117 A Canadian
prosecutor lacks the systemic power of an American prosecutor in
relation to plea negotiations.
That is not to suggest that Canada’s criminal justice system is free
of systemic injustice. Canada incarcerates indigenous people at a rate
far in excess of non-indigenous peoples. 118 Marie Manikis has argued
that Canadian prosecutors ought to, as a matter of professional duty, be
required to prosecute cases in light of law that ameliorates the sentences
of indigenous offenders. 119 The less punitive nature of Canadian
criminal law simply softens the impact of that injustice relative to
America.
IV. FRANCE
The French criminal justice system is rooted in the inquisitorial
model of criminal procedure. 120 Under this model, a neutral judicial
116. See, e.g., R. v. Cody, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659 (Can.); R. v. Antic, [2017] S.C.R. 509
(Can.) (explaining requirements for judicial interim release); R. v. Jordan, 2016 S.C.R. 631
(Can.).
117. See Luna & Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, supra note 9, at 1422. The one place where
a prosecutor would have some serious leverage is if an accused committed multiple homicides,
given that Canadian law now permits consecutive mandatory minimum sentences (i.e., a
potential mandatory sentence of seventy-five years for a triple homicide).
118. Backgrounder: Aboriginal Offenders – A Critical Situation, OFF. OF THE
CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/oth-aut/othaut20121022info-eng.aspx [https://perma.cc/UYE6-GEJF].
119. See Marie Manikis, Towards Accountability and Fairness for Aboriginal People: The
Recognition of Gladue as a Principle of Fundamental Justice That Applies to Prosecutors, 21
CANADIAN CRIM. L. REV. 173 (2016).
120. The terms ‘inquisitorial’ and ‘adversarial’ are imperfect and some scholars have
criticized the extensive use of these categories in comparative criminal justice. See, e.g.,
Máximo Langer, The Long Shadow of the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Categories, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014),
available at http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199673599.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199673599-e-39 [https://perma.cc/CU5E-CCPP];

610

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

officer is tasked with carrying out an official investigation into the
crime to establish the truth. By contrast, in the adversarial model, each
party conducts its own inquiry and presents its findings to a passive
adjudicator. 121 Inquisitorial roots explain the normative claims
underpinning the role of public prosecutors in French criminal
procedure. The juge d’instruction (the investigative judge) is usually
presented as the paradigmatic example of the neutral judicial officer in
the French inquisitorial procedure: Article 81 of the Code de procedure
pénale (Code of Criminal Procedure) (“CPP”) states that the juge
d’instruction “undertakes in accordance with the law any investigative
step he deems useful for the discovery of the truth. He seeks out
evidence of innocence as well as guilt.” 122 Yet, in practice, less than
two percent of cases are dealt with in this way. 123 The vast majority of
cases are nowadays investigated by the police under the supervision of
another judicial officer, the public prosecutor.
Procureurs belong to the magistrature (the French career-trained
judiciary) along with trial judges and juges d’instruction. Magistrats
can and do switch between roles throughout their career. As magistrats,
French public prosecutors are required to act in and uphold the public
interest. When supervising police investigations, procureurs must
therefore ensure that evidence of innocence as well as guilt is collected.
Furthermore, they have an important role as guarantors of individual
freedoms as they supervise the period of police detention, called the
garde à vue (“GAV”). This role flows from Article 66 of the
Constitution which proclaims: “No one shall be arbitrarily detained.
The judicial authority, guardian of the freedom of the individual, shall
ensure compliance with this principle in the conditions laid down by

John D. Jackson, The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards
Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?, 68 MOD. L. REV. 737, 737–64 (2005). However,
the traditional distinction remains useful to explain fundamental differences between legal
cultures as each system remains rooted in its own tradition, even though no system is a pure
representation of one model or the other.
121. See Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 506–89 (1973).
122. Code de procédure pénale [C. com] [Criminal Procedure Code], art. 81 (Fr.).
123. Calculated as a percentage of cases proceeded with by public prosecutors (i.e.
including prosecutions and alternatives to prosecution), 16,772 cases out of 1,110,952 were sent
to the juge d’instruction (around 1.51%, or 2.89% of prosecuted cases) in 2015. See LES
CHIFFRES-CLÉFS DE LA JUSTICE 2016, MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE 14 (2016), available at
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_CC%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XP4-EVWZ].
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statute.” 124 The Conseil constitutionnel (French constitutional court)
has repeated on a number of occasions that the “judicial authority”
included both judges and public prosecutors. 125
Ethical rules compiled by the High Council for the Judiciary apply
to both judges and prosecutors. Paragraph C.41 insists on the
impartiality that should characterize procureurs’ decisions: “[i]n all
their professional activities and particularly when directing
investigations and supervising police officers’ activities, prosecutors
shall endeavor to objectively seek evidence that will establish the
truth,” 126 which clearly excludes seeking to obtain a conviction at all
costs.
These normative claims also form part of the rhetoric used by
public prosecutors themselves to describe their role. A public
prosecutor Soubise interviewed for her doctoral study 127 described his
role as such: “We must be impartial and I lay claim [je revendique]128
to the procureur’s impartiality up until the moment he stands up to
speak at trial . . . where he asks for a sentence, where he asks for the
defendant to be found guilty and to be sentenced.” 129
Crucially, the status of magistrat afforded to procureurs has
practical consequences on French criminal procedure. Most
importantly, the role of the defense lawyer is greatly diminished, in
comparison to its Anglo-American counterparts. 130 Since the
124. 1958 CONST. art. 66 (Fr.).
125. See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 93-326 DC,
du 11 août 1993, Jan. 4, 1993, at ¶ 5 (Fr.), available at www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
decision/1993/93326dc.htm [https://perma.cc/C5CR-FW45]; Conseil Constitutionnel [CC]
[Constitutional Court] decision No. 2004-492 DC du 2 mars 2004, Mar. 2, 2004, at ¶ 98 (Fr.),
available at www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2004/2004492dc.htm
[https://perma.cc/TKW9-LQJJ]; Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision
No.2010-14/22 QPC du 30 juillet 2010, July 30, 2010, at ¶ 26 (Fr.), available at www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2010/201014_22qpc.htm [https://perma.cc/W797-5TWK].
126. Compendium of the Judiciary’s Ethical Obligations, ¶ C.41 (2010) (Fr.).
127. Soubise observed the work of procureurs at a medium court center for two months
in 2013 and carried out semi-structured interviews with nine prosecutors for her 2016 doctoral
study. Soubise coded her interviews with the letters “FR” for France and a number.
128. “Je revendique” can be translated in several ways: to claim or to lay claim to, but also
to demand something and/or to affirm/assert it.
129. Interview respondent FR8.
130. See JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE
ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE 102 (Hart
Publishing 2005); Daniel Soulez-Larivière, Le problème du ministère public francais, AJ PÉNAL
112 (2011); Stewart Field & Andrew West, Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: French
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investigation is supervised by a magistrat and is supposed to have
collected both incriminatory and exculpatory evidence, its findings are
perceived as particularly trustworthy. According to inquisitorial
principles, there is no need for a parallel investigation by the defense,
as would be expected in an adversarial system. The case file forms the
centerpiece of the trial: it is read by trial judges prior to the hearing and
judges use the evidence included in the file as a basis to question the
defendant. It is rare for witnesses to be called at the trial since their
statements can simply be read from the file. 131 It is particularly difficult
for defense lawyers to challenge the results of the judicial inquiry,
given their perceived bias in favor of their client, as opposed to the
supposedly neutral judicial investigation. 132
The role of ensuring a fair and accurate assessment of guilt
theoretically played by procureurs justified, until recently, the fact that
defense lawyers were not permitted to advise suspects at the police
station or to attend police interrogations. Since due process rights of
suspects were supposed to be guaranteed by the prosecutor, there was
no need—the argument went—for defense lawyers. The participation
of defense lawyers in pre-trial investigations has slowly developed, in
particular due to the influence of the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”). 133
Their status of magistrats also justifies the central role played by
procureurs in French criminal procedure. Not only do they decide
whether to and on what charge to prosecute a case, but they can also
divert the case to an alternative to prosecution or choose which
procedural pathway (e.g., guilty plea, speedy on-file procedure,
traditional trial, etc.) to use. In recent years, their status as a magistrat
has justified the transfer of powers from judges to procureurs in order
Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial Criminal Process, 14 CRIM. L. F. 261, 216-316 (2003);
Stewart Field, Judicial Supervision and the Pre-Trial Process, 21 J. L. SOC. 119, 119-35 (1994).
131. A different procedure applies for serious crimes, such as rape and homicide. Cases
involving defendants accused of those serious offenses are heard by the Cour d’assises, the only
criminal court involving a jury of citizens in the French legal system. Unlike in less serious
cases, witnesses are called before the Cour d’assises.
132. See Jacqueline Hodgson, The Role of the Criminal Defence Lawyer in an Inquisitorial
Procedure: Legal and Ethical Constraints, 9 LEGAL ETHICS 125–44 (2006); Field & West,
supra, note 130 at 296–97.
133. See JODIE BLACKSTOCK ET AL., INSIDE POLICE CUSTODY: AN EMPIRICAL ACCOUNT
OF SUSPECTS’ RIGHTS IN FOUR JURISDICTIONS (2014); Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, “North of
the Border and Across the Channel”: Custodial Legal Assistance Reforms in Scotland and
France, CRIM. L. REV. 369, 369–84 (2013).
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to speed up the criminal justice process. The ordonnance pénale is a
procedure in which the judge makes a decision purely on the
prosecution papers, without a hearing, effectively giving procureur an
adjudicating function in practice. 134 Two new procedures, such as the
composition pénale (introduced in 1999) and the comparution
préalable sur reconnaissance de culpabilité (“CRPC”) (introduced in
2004), even give procureurs sentencing powers as they can offer a
sentence to defendants who have admitted their guilt. 135 All these new
procedures require the validation of a judge, but the checks have been
described as “succinct” by researchers. 136 However, some French
scholars have defended these new procedures on the grounds that the
prosecutor is a magistrat and, as such a “natural defender of freedoms,
just like judges.” 137
The French criminal justice system, along with other
inquisitorially based systems, is classically described as relying on
internal bureaucratic accountability to keep public officials, such as
procureurs, in check. 138 The Ministry of Justice issues circulars which
define its prosecution priorities or its interpretation of new law. The
implementation of these national policies is ensured by the centralized
hierarchy of the French public prosecution service, with the Minister
of Justice at the top. However, the hierarchical organization of the
134. It should be noted, however, that these new procedures have resulted in formal
agreements between judges and prosecutors on the type of cases which should be dealt with by
ordonnance pénale, composition pénale or CRPC. This includes an agreement on the kind of
sentence that is appropriate in these cases. Thus, although judges have lost decision-making
power, they have regained some of it ahead of the decision to prosecute. See, e.g., S. Grunvald,
Les choix et schémas d’orientation, in 4 LA REPONSE PENALE DIX ANS DE TRAITEMENT DES
DELITS 109–10 (J. Danet ed., 2013) ; Vanessa Perrocheau, La Composition Pénale et La
Comparution Sur Reconnaissance de Culpabilité : Quelles Limites à l’omnipotence Du
Parquet?, in 1 DROIT ET SOCIETE 55 (2010) ; Jean Danet & Sylvie Grunvald, Brèves Remarques
Tirées d’une Première Évaluation de La Composition Pénale, in AJ PENAL 196 (2004); JeanDaniel Régnault, Composition Pénale : L’exemple Du Tribunal de Cambrai, in AJ PENAL 55
(2003).
135. See generally Laurene Soubise, Guilty Pleas in an Inquisitorial Setting – An
Empirical Study of France, J. L. & SOC’Y, 398, 398-426 (2018).
136. Claire Saas, De la composition pénale au plaider-coupable: le pouvoir de sanction
du procureur, REV. SCI. CRIM. & COMP. L. 827, 827-43 (2004).
137. Jean Pradel, Défense du plaidoyer de culpabilité. À propos du projet de loi sur les
évolutions de la criminalité, SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, 169, 169–71 (2004).
138. For a classic account, see MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986); see also Ronald F.
Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH &
LEE L. REV. 1587, 1587-620 (2010).
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French prosecution service is characterized by a system of loyalty and
trust rather than strict orders demanding disciplined obedience.
Moreover, ministerial circulars often limit themselves to broad
principles and relatively vague targets, allowing for wide prosecutorial
discretion in practice. 139
Although the professional ethos and ethical rules emphasize a
neutral attitude for prosecutors, the behavior of prosecutors in practice
does not match these aspirations. Empirical research has showed that
the relationship between police investigators and procureurs is
characterized by mutual trust, rather than by checks and close
monitoring. Mouhanna noted the strong interdependence which exists
between police investigators and procureurs. 140 Public prosecutors are
largely office-based and therefore depend on the police for any
information, while police officers need procureurs as the police’s own
legal powers are limited. 141 Mouhanna thus observed a relationship of
trust between police and prosecutors, based on a shared objective of
putting together procedurally strong cases, i.e., legally solid cases
which cannot be taken apart by defense lawyers. 142 The importance of
trust has been reinforced by the introduction of traitement en temps réel
(real time processing) where procureurs receive reports from police
investigators over the phone. 143 In Soubise’s own research, one
procureur confirmed the importance of trust in supervising police
investigations:
A lot of things are actually based on trust. Phone duty has taken
such proportions, that it’s obvious that it cannot be managed
without trust. If every time we have a case, we ask for the file to
be sent to us by post, so that we can check what’s in it, because we
don’t trust the officer who is reporting to us, it becomes
unmanageable! 144

139. See Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 19.
140. See generally Christian Mouhanna, Les relations police-parquet en France: un
partenariat mis en cause?, 58 DROIT SOCIETE 505 (2004).
141. For instance, although police officers can decide to detain a person at the police
station, the procureur can order her immediate release or refuse to extend the detention period
over twenty-four hours.
142. CHRISTIAN MOUHANNA, POLICES JUDICIAIRES ET MAGISTRATS : UNE AFFAIRE DE
CONFIANCE (2001); Mouhanna, supra note 140.
143. BENOIT BASTARD & CHRISTIAN MOUHANNA, UNE JUSTICE DANS L’URGENCE: LE
TRAITEMENT EN TEMPS REEL DES AFFAIRES PENALES (2007).
144. Interview respondent FR2.
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Procureurs are therefore primarily concerned with the formal
conformity of the case file to due process safeguards, rather than their
actual application. For instance, they can check that the police have
properly recorded that they have informed the suspect of his rights, but
they do not check how and in which circumstances this notification has
been done.
Furthermore, Hodgson found that a crime control perspective
often infused procureurs’ understanding of “the public interest.” For
instance, she observed that procureurs frequently extend the police
detention period over twenty-four hours to put pressure on suspects to
confess. 145 This was confirmed by Soubise’s own, more recent,
observations where a procureur told the police that he was going to
extend the police detention while commenting “you need to work him
up. . . . Carry on questioning him late tonight and early tomorrow
morning.” 146 In another case where the police carried out an illegal
house search in which they seized a computer, the procureur
considered trying to keep the computer as evidence, in the hope that the
defense would not raise the illegality of the search before deciding to
return the computer to the suspect and ask whether he would agree to
let the police examine it. 147 This behavior is clearly at odds with the
image of neutral judicial officer linked to the status of magistrat and
suggests that defense of the defendant’s interests is actually seen as the
responsibility of the defense lawyer, rather than that of the prosecutor.
It is interesting to note that the procureur decided to act in conformity
with the ethos of magistrats in the end, although it remains unclear
whether this could partly be explained by the presence of the
researcher, as well as a trainee magistrat at the time.
Although these examples suggest a conviction mindset, there is
little evidence that French prosecutors engage in similar misconduct to
that of American or Canadian prosecutors. Several reasons can account
for that. First, procureurs have different powers from adversarial
prosecutors. Although they can require the police to interview a
particular witness, all witness statements are automatically added to the
case file and prosecutors do not have the possibility to select witnesses
whose accounts fit the prosecution case. Similarly, French prosecutors
do not have the power to select the evidence which should be disclosed
145. Hodgson, supra note 10 at 171–77.
146. Case F-47 (on file with author).
147. Case F-49 (on file with author).
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to the defense as the dossier of evidence must be disclosed in full. As
witnesses are often absent from court, witness coaching or aggressive
cross-examination are unlikely to be an issue either. The interrogation
of the defendant (or any other witness present) is principally conducted
by the trial judge and prosecutors can merely ask additional questions
afterwards. However, French public prosecutors have been disciplined
for making inflammatory or racist statements to the court, for instance
by linking the belonging of the defendant to the travelers’ community
to a criminal lifestyle. 148
Second, although procureurs’ decisions are recorded on file—
mostly by the police who note that they are acting in accordance with
the procureur’s instructions—there is no recording of the reasons that
have led to the decision. This absence of reasons is in line with the
dominant perception in French legal culture that the application of the
law is an objective task leading to a logical conclusion and, therefore,
there is no need to detail the reasoning behind it, 149 but it is also an
obstacle to any in-depth review of procureurs’ decisions. Audits
therefore remain rare in the French criminal justice system and have
been limited to miscarriages of justice, such as the Outreau case in
which thirteen out of seventeen defendants were acquitted (seven in
first instance and six on appeal) in 2004-05, after having spent several
years in pre-trial detention. A working party was immediately set up by
the Ministry of Justice, 150 followed by a parliamentary inquiry. 151 Since
serious and complex cases such as Outreau are dealt with through the
instruction procedure, the reports and ensuing public debates mainly
focused on the work of the juge d’instruction in the case, rather than
the procureur. The reports into the Outreau scandal blamed the
prosecutor for failures which amounted to negligence rather than
willful misconduct. The prosecutor in the case was not sanctioned.

148. See P082, CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE LA MAGISTRATURE (Oct. 13, 2015),
www.conseil-superieur-magistrature.fr/missions/discipline/p082
[https://perma.cc/7ZYPUWPW]; P052, CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE LA MAGISTRATURE (Jan. 27, 2006), www.conseilsuperieur-magistrature.fr/missions/discipline/p052 [https://perma.cc/K68L-QJH5].
149. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH LEGAL CULTURES (2001); JACQUELINE HODGSON,
FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21-25 (2005); CHRISTOPHE MINCKE, EFFICACITE, EFFICIENCE ET
LEGITIMITE DEMOCRATIQUE DU MINISTERE PUBLIC: QUAND L’ARBRE CACHE LA FORET
(2002).
150. MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE, RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL CHARGE DE TIRER LES
ENSEIGNEMENTS DUE TRAITEMENT JUDICIAIRE DE L’AFFAIRE DITE ‘D’OUTREAU’ (2005).
151. PHILIPPE HOUILLON, ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, No. 3125 (June 6, 2006).
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Crucially, the non-partisan gathering of evidence by the police
under the authority of the procureur is one of the main safeguards of
inquisitorial systems against miscarriages of justice. Although defense
lawyers have been progressively granted a greater role in
investigations, they are still largely unable to compensate for the
conviction mindset of the procureur and the resulting imbalance in the
investigation. There is indeed limited opportunity in French criminal
procedure to test the evidence presented in the dossier as the result of
the judicial investigation. Yet, the CSM refuses to examine the way
prosecutors carry out their duty to conduct an impartial investigation:
“the determination by the procureur of the tasks to be completed during
the preliminary investigation comes under his discretionary powers and
cannot constitute a disciplinary fault, as long as it does not demonstrate
negligence of a particular gravity or the will to harm the rights of the
parties.” 152
The status of magistrat performs a crucial legitimizing role for
procureurs as guarantors of society’s interests, but the sufficiency of
that perspective is being challenged. The ECtHR ruled that the
procureur could not be the “competent legal authority” or the “other
officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power” referred to in the
first and third paragraphs of Article 5 of the European Convention of
Human Rights (“ECHR”) 153 because they do not “offer the requisite
guarantees of independence from the executive and the parties, which
precludes [their] subsequent intervention in criminal proceedings on

152. See P058, CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE LA MAGISTRATURE (July 18, 2008),
www.conseil-superieur-magistrature.fr/missions/discipline/p058
([https://perma.cc/NC7WDA47].
153. European Convention of Human Rights, art. 5, ¶ 1(c); ¶ 3 (1950):
(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law: . . . (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion
of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so.
(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c)
of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time
or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for
trial.
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behalf of the prosecuting authority.” 154 The ECtHR rulings were
followed by the Cour de cassation 155 who recognized that the
procureur was not a judicial authority within the meaning of Article 5,
section 3 of the ECHR.156 Despite being anticipated, 157 these decisions
were described as a “judicial earthquake,” 158 a “storm,” 159 or the
“sound of the death knell” for the French prosecutor. 160
The idea of a split of the magistrature into two separate
professional bodies for judges and public prosecutors seems to be
gaining momentum as a 2010 study found that a majority of defense
lawyers, but also of judges, wished for a split of the magistrature.161
The same research found that procureurs were for the most part
opposed to this, fearing an “Anglo-Saxon” drift, where prosecutors
154. Medvedyev & Others v. France, 2010-III Eu. Ct. H.R. ¶ 124; see Moulin v. France,
App. 37104/06, ¶ 59 (2010) (ECtHR) available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#
{%22itemid%22:[%22001-101876%22]} [https://perma.cc/96KH-CDRM]; Medvedyev &
Others v. France, App No. 3394/03, ¶ 61 (2008) (ECtHR.), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87369 [https://perma.cc/QP3E-DQ5J].
155. The Cour de cassation is the highest court in the French judiciary. It is not a third
level of jurisdiction as it does not rule on the merits of a case. When decisions are referred to the
Cour de Cassation, the Court is merely required to decide whether the law has been correctly
applied by the lower courts based on the facts.
156. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 15, 2010,
Bull. crim., no. 207 (Fr.).
157. Already in 2003, Renucci warned that the procureur might not meet the requirements
detailed in ECtHR case-law to be the “other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power”
referred to in the third paragraph of Article 5 of the ECHR. See Jean-François Renucci, Le
procureur de la République est-il un magistrat au sens de l’article 5, § 3, Conv. EDH ?, RECL.
DALLOZ 2268 (2003); Jean-François Renucci, Le procureur de la République est-il un
“magistrat” au sens européen du terme?, in LIBERTES, JUSTICE, TOLERANCE : MELANGES EN
HOMMAGE AU DOYEN GERARD COHEN-JONATHAN VOL. II. 1345 (2004). His concern was later
shared by Jean-Paul Jean who argued that this called in favor of a strengthening of the
prosecutorial independence in France. See Jean-Paul Jean, Le ministère public entre modèle
jacobin et modèle européen, REV. SCI. CRIMINELLE 670 (2005).
158. Jean-François Renucci, Un séisme judiciaire : pour la Cour européenne des droits de
l’homme, les magistrats du parquet ne sont pas une autorité judiciaire, RECL. DALLOZ 600
(2009).
159. Jean-Pierre Marguénaud, Tempête sur le Parquet, REV. SCI. CRIMINELLE 176 (2009).
160. Frédéric Sudre, Le glas du parquet, SEM. JURID. 2277 (2010).
161. See PHILIP MILBURN, KATIA KOSTULSKI & DENIS SALAS, LES PROCUREURS, ENTRE
VOCATION JUDICIARE ET FONCTIONS POLITIQUES 147-48 (2010); see Bertrand Louvel, First
President of the Cour de Cassation, L’évolution de l’environnement institutionnel du magistrat,
Speech (Sept. 21, 2015), available at https://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_26/
discours_publications_diverses_
2039/discours_2202/premier_president_7084/ouverture_cadej_ebm_21.09.15_32569.html
[https://perma.cc/YZ99-8MS6] (remarking on his regret regarding the confusion between
judicial and executive functions represented by the French parquet).
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would be reduced to the role of public accusers. They felt that their
status of magistrat was essential to defend their position. 162 JeanClaude Marin, the Procureur Général for the Cour de cassation, 163 also
defended the status of public prosecutors as judicial officers,
comparing their role to that of their foreign counterparts, in a 2016
speech to the Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature: “The French
prosecutor is not solely a prosecuting authority, limiting her role to that
of the accusing party in the criminal trial.” 164 In particular, he
underlined the importance of the role of prosecutors in supervising
police investigations, by contrast with “many countries, in particular
Anglo-Saxon, where the police carry out their investigations in a very
autonomous manner.” 165
In reaction to the ECtHR decisions, recent legislative acts seem
like attempts by the French legislator to win back the status of judicial
officer for the procureur. Thus, the Act of July 25, 2013 amended
Article 31 of the CPP which now proclaims that “the procureur
exercises the prosecution function and enforces the law in conformity
with the principle of impartiality which apply to him.” The Act of June
3, 2016 carried on the trend with the second paragraph of the new
Article 39-3 of the CCP which provides that the procureur “ensures
that [police] investigations aim to the discovery of the truth and seek
evidence of innocence as well as guilt.” Both amendments underline
the neutrality of the procureur’s function in supervising the police
investigation and in deciding whether to prosecute or not. However, it
is unlikely that these new legislative rules will have much impact in
practice. As we have seen, both ethical rules and the professional ethos
of magistrats already defined a neutral role for French public
prosecutors, but it has failed to translate into practice.

162. MILBURN, KOSTULSKI & SALAS, supra note 161, at 149–51.
163. The Procureur Général of the Cour de cassation does not prosecute cases. Her most
important task is to ensure a harmonized interpretation of the law and that the case-law of the
Court and all lower courts is consistent. The Procureur général acts as public prosecutor only
in the Cour de justice de la République, competent to hear criminal cases against ministers for
offences committed in carrying out their duties.
164. Jean-Claude Marin, Attorney General of the Cour de Cassation, L’indépendance
statutaire du parquet est-elle compatible avec la définition d’une politique pénale nationale,
Speech (Sept. 29, 2016), available at https://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG///
JC%20MARIN%20-%20CADEJ%20-%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ5P-PBBG].
165. Id.
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Although legal and ethical rules insist on the duty for prosecutors
to act impartially, case law traditionally refuses to apply the principle
of impartiality to public prosecutors, further underlining the
ambivalence of their role. The Cour de cassation thus decided that the
procureur “whose role is to support the prosecution [and who] does not
take part in the judgment of the accused” does not come under the
provisions of Article 6 of the ECHR which guarantees the right to a fair
trial, including the right to be tried by an independent and impartial
tribunal. 166 Even after the recent amendment of Article 31 of the CPP,
the Cour de cassation found that the ground based on the perceived
partiality of the public prosecutor in a specific case is ineffective,
because the procureur does not decide on the validity of a criminal
accusation. 167
The French criminal justice system is not a pure representation of
the inquisitorial model. Whilst the functions of investigation,
prosecution and trial used to be concentrated in the hands of a single
person, the lieutenant criminel, 168 some elements of party contest have
been introduced over the past centuries, such as the office of the public
prosecutor and the defense lawyer. However, the three functions
remain linked ideologically and structurally through the common
professional body of the magistrature. As a result, public prosecutors
carry out an ambivalent role: representing society, they are tasked with
enforcing the criminal law against suspected offenders, whilst
protecting the rights of those same people. In practice, French public
prosecutors have been unable to discharge these competing roles
effectively and have increasingly emphasized their role in ensuring
convictions over protecting the rights of an accused.
V. COMPARISONS AND OBSERVATIONS
Prosecutors in America, Canada and France are all subject to the
seek justice imperative; 169 in all three jurisdictions the expectation of
prosecutors is that they will not seek simply to convict or to “win,” but
166. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 10, 1986,
Bull. crim., no. 370 (Fr.); see André Giudicelli, Principe d’impartialité : comment l’appliquer
au ministère public ?, 2017 REV. SCI. CRIMINELLE 81, 81–84 (2017).
167. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Mar. 9, 2016,
Bull. crim., no. 14-86.7957 (Fr.).
168. Hodgson, supra note 10 at 68.
169. See supra, notes 30, 73-83, 118 and accompanying text.
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will rather take some responsibility for the fairness of the process and
the accuracy of the verdict. 170 The duty in France is articulated and
understood differently because of the inquisitorial system of justice,
whereas the Canadian duty mirrors almost exactly its American
counterpart in seeking to reconcile the dual role of prosecutors in
deciding whether the evidence and the public interest warrant pursuing
a matter, and in acting as an adversarial advocate in a criminal trial. As
in the United States, the Canadian duty is not clearly articulated, and
its precise implications for what a prosecutor ought to do remain
unclear. In France, the duty is more clearly expressed as the duty to
conduct an impartial investigation and therefore to ensure the
collection of evidence of innocence as well as guilt. However, the
enforcement of this duty in practice remains problematic.
All three jurisdictions have issues with prosecutors who fail to live
up to the seek justice norms to which they are subject. 171 Better
evidence for the existence and significance of prosecutorial misconduct
exists in Canada and the United States than in France. In both Canada
and the United States prosecutors have contributed to wrongful
convictions, and act in ways that undermine the fairness and accuracy
of trials. 172 In France, there has been limited research on the role of
prosecutors in miscarriages of justice. As in many jurisdictions,
miscarriages of justice in France tend to be detected for the most
serious crimes, such as rape and homicide. Since those crimes are
investigated by an investigative judge (leaving the public prosecutor
with a limited role), reviews of the criminal justice process following
these wrongful convictions tend to focus on the judge rather than the
prosecutor. At the same time, the evidence in France supports the
suggestion that French prosecutors engage in acts contrary to their role,
failing in particular to properly oversee and control criminal
investigations.
There is no data about the relative prevalence of misconduct in
Canada as compared to the United States. The comparatively sparse
commentary on prosecutors in Canada could suggest that prosecutorial
misconduct occurs less frequently in Canada; however, that sparsity
could be a product of the deficiencies in Canadian scholarship on legal
170. See supra, notes 30, 73-83, 118 and accompanying text.
171. See supra, notes 20-30, 33-36, 105-16, 140-47 and accompanying text.
172. See supra, Parts II and III.

622

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

ethics, 173 and Canada’s relatively small population, rather than a
reflection of prosecutorial probity. Having said that, the nature and
extent of prosecutorial misconduct does vary between the jurisdictions.
There is relatively little evidence, for example, that Canadian
prosecutors take advantage of systemic factors to coerce plea
agreements from an accused. 174 Indeed, the lack of severe mandatory
minimums, the representation of accused in serious cases, the
requirement to bring a trial forward in a reasonable time, and the easier
availability of judicial interim release makes it very difficult for a
Canadian prosecutor to coerce a plea agreement, even were they so
inclined. 175
The structures in which prosecutors work vary between the
jurisdictions, to a lesser (e.g., Canada) and greater (e.g., France)
extent. 176 Canadian prosecutors are never elected, but like their
American counterparts they have responsibility for both decisions
about whether and how to proceed in a matter, and for conducting a
trial within an adversarial system. 177 French prosecutors are appointed
judicial officers with a similar status as judges. They are responsible
for supervising the police investigation and ensure the non-partisan
collection of evidence in the case dossier which will become the
centerpiece of any subsequent trial.
The regulation and oversight of prosecutors across all
jurisdictions suffers from material gaps. 178 In all three jurisdictions the
guidance given to prosecutors by regulatory bodies is relatively
minimal. 179 All Canadian prosecutors can access policy manuals or
guidebooks published by their employers on which they can rely, and
which may shape the cultures of prosecutorial offices. 180 In addition,
case law guides American and Canadian prosecutors regarding their
173. Adam Dodek, Canadian Legal Ethics: A Subject in Search of Scholarship, 50 U.
TORONTO L.J. 115 (2000); Adam Dodek, Canadian Legal Ethics: Ready for the Twenty-First
Century at Last, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (2008).
174. See supra, notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
175. Id.
176. See supra, notes 53-61, 65-104, 120-139 and accompanying text.
177. See supra, Part III.
178. See supra, 53-60, 68-102, 122-139 and accompanying text.
179. See supra, Parts II-IV.
180. Some American prosecutors also have policy manuals, although by no means all. It
should be noted that even with policy manuals and guidebooks, practices can very between
different prosecutor offices in Canada. See Glen Luther, The Frayed and Tarnished Silver
Thread: Stinchcombe and the Role of Crown Counsel in Alberta, 40 ALBERTA L. REV. 567
(2002).
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prosecutorial duties—identifying behavior that is properly
characterized as misconduct and the constraints that apply to
prosecutors in the conduct of a trial. At the same time, however, courts
grant both Canadian and American prosecutors almost unfettered
independence in relation to their decisions about whether and in what
way to bring forward a prosecution, and they also defer to prosecutors
on matters of trial strategy. In France, the main source of prosecutorial
guidance is the Code of Criminal Procedure, complemented by
circulars from the Ministry of Justice, as well as broad ethical
guidelines from the Higher Council for the Judiciary. However,
although procureurs are theoretically accountable to their hierarchy
and, ultimately, to parliament through the Minister of Justice, they
enjoy a wide degree of discretion and rarely have to give reasons for
their decisions in practice. Importantly, in no jurisdiction do
prosecutors risk meaningful personal consequences when they engage
in misconduct. 181
What follows from these comparative observations in relation to
the proposals for addressing prosecutorial misconduct that arise in the
American literature—reforming the “do justice” imperative, improving
regulation of prosecutors or changing the structure or culture in which
prosecutors work? 182
In our view, looking at the United States, Canada and France
suggests that structural and systemic factors have the most significant
impact on the nature and extent of prosecutorial misconduct. While
misconduct occurs in all three jurisdictions, both the similarities and
the differences in that misconduct seem directly related to similarities
and differences between how prosecutors work in the different
jurisdictions. Canadian and French prosecutors are less likely to abuse
decisions on whether and how to proceed against a criminal accused
because doing so is not usually possible. On the other hand, both
American and Canadian prosecutors do from time to time engage in
unduly adversarial conduct in a trial. That seems likely to reflect their
shared structural obligation to act as adversarial advocates; if we want
prosecutors to be adversarial advocates, it is unsurprising that, from
time to time, some of them will take that obligation too far. In France,
in conformity with the inquisitorial tradition, more weight is attached
181. Subject to the caveat that it is at least theoretically possible that prosecutors in Canada
and France who commit misconduct lose their job or suffer other work-related consequences.
182. See supra, notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
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to the pre-trial phase where the evidence should be collected in a nonpartisan manner. At trial, the judge plays an active role in interrogating
the defendant and any potential witnesses based on the dossier of
evidence, leaving only a peripheral role to the procureur and, therefore,
more limited opportunity for prosecutorial misconduct to have a
serious impact on the outcome. For French prosecutors, the issues arise
in the area where they have relatively unfettered power—the
supervision of an investigation.
If we want to change prosecutorial behavior to a significant
extent, we need to change the structural factors that produce the
behavior we do not want. This may include measures suggested by
American scholars around separating the prosecutorial and adversarial
function from Canadian and American prosecutors, permitting some
judicial review of prosecutorial decision-making in Canada and
America, but also working towards improving the justice of the
criminal law for which prosecutors are responsible. In France, the most
productive changes are likely to be ones which reduce or check the
power of prosecutors in relation to the supervision of investigations–
that is, which discourage the uncritical acceptance by French
prosecutors of improper investigatory practices. These changes may
not be realistically likely to be adopted, but the comparative experience
between America, France and Canada suggests that it is in structural
reforms that prosecutorial misconduct can be addressed.
The comparisons offer less clear support for the importance of
culture to shaping prosecutorial decisions. All Canadian prosecutors
have guidelines and policy manuals, and in general the professional
culture of Canadian lawyers is different from the United States, tending
to be somewhat less focused on the unqualified virtues of
zealousness. 183 Yet Canadian prosecutors still commit professional
misconduct. The nature and extent of that misconduct may be less
significant and consequential than that which occurs in the United
States, but we do not have data to support that conclusion. It may also
be that the guidelines given to all Canadian prosecutors with respect to
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion support prosecutors in not
engaging in misconduct when exercising that discretion. We suspect,
however, that the systemic factors are far more significant in preventing
that behavior. Although strong inquisitorial expectations shape the role
183. See Alice Woolley, Integrity in Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions
of the Canadian and American Lawyer, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 61 (1996).

2018] PROSECUTORS & JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 625
of the French prosecutor in theory, research has shown that procureurs
often share the police crime control objectives in practice, putting the
fairness of the French criminal process at risk, given the limited role
afforded to defense lawyers. It may be that cultural initiatives could
shift the attitudes of French prosecutors favoring crime control, but it
is unclear how, absent a structural shift, that change could be
accomplished. In our view, reforms directed at improving prosecutorial
culture are unlikely to be particularly effective in changing
prosecutorial behavior unless coupled with structural reforms.
With respect to regulatory responses, the current absence of
meaningful regulation, when combined with the observation that
structural factors materially affect prosecutorial conduct, suggests that
improving how we regulate prosecutors may be effective in improving
prosecutorial behavior. It is hard not to see some regulatory response
as being better than next to none. Meaningful regulation in the form of
clear rules, real consequences for violation of the rules, or—more
importantly—adopting innovative forms of compliance regulation for
prosecutorial offices may have a meaningful positive impact on
prosecutorial behavior. On the other hand, the cross-jurisdictional
unwillingness to regulate prosecutors may also suggest, as Green and
Zacharias noted, 184 that more rigorous regulation is not realistically
likely to be pursued. Neither courts nor regulators in any jurisdiction
have shown much enthusiasm for addressing prosecutorial misbehavior
through regulatory means.
Finally, with respect to reforms focused on the “do justice” norm,
while no jurisdiction articulates that norm particularly well, the fact that
all three jurisdictions rely on it, yet have material deficiencies in
prosecutorial conduct, makes us skeptical about the capacity for a better
articulated norm to, on its own, change prosecutorial behavior. As
acknowledged, the norms as currently stated do not provide especially
useful direction to prosecutors and, in Canada and the United States at
least, suffer from internal incoherence and deep ambiguity. The various
proposals for better articulating what that norm means and requires
would inarguably improve its capacity for shaping prosecutorial
behavior (although which approach was adopted would require
normative choices to be made, since the proposals do not all run in the
same direction). At the same time, no honest prosecutor could claim
that the behavior documented in case law and studies of prosecutorial
184. Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7, at 58-59.
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behavior is consistent with the “do justice” ethic, however inadequately
that ethic has been expressed. The things prosecutors sometimes do in
Canada, the United States and, to a lesser extent, in France involve
trying to win at all costs, denying procedural rights to the accused and
tilting the scales of justice in favor of conviction; acting, in other words,
entirely contrary to what a prosecutor would do if they were seeking
justice. This suggests, in our view, that more carefully or deeply
explaining the “do justice” ethic will not, without more, meaningfully
affect prosecutorial behavior. Structural and regulatory changes are
what is required.
Our comparative analysis thus concludes on a somewhat gloomy
note—the most effective changes are likely to be structural and
regulatory, but they are also the least likely to be pursued. Changes that
may be less difficult to achieve, to culture or to how we articulate
governing norms, are the least likely to have any effect on prosecutorial
behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
No group of lawyers has higher ambitions, yet so significantly and
frequently fails to achieve them, than criminal prosecutors. Prosecutors
in America, Canada, and France seek to do justice but, albeit in
different ways, do not. Can we do better? American academic literature
has set out different paths for reform—through shifts to the structure,
regulation, culture or norms governing American prosecutors. The
comparative analysis of this paper, which considers the similarities and
differences between the norms, behavior and work environment of
American, Canadian, and French prosecutors, provides some insights
into the merits of those proposed reforms. The question going forward
will be whether any of these jurisdictions will be willing to embrace
reform, particularly the sorts of reforms most likely to create better
behavior by prosecutors. Ensuring prosecutors accomplish justice
requires something different than telling them to be just: it requires
making justice likely in light of the substantive norms of the criminal
law and the structural design of the criminal justice system. A criminal
justice system that punishes unjustly, or grants prosecutors unchecked
power, will not reliably accomplish any sort of justice.

